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INTRODUCTION
The predominant approach thus far to achieving equity in international climate
control treaties has been to exempt developing countries from compulsory emissions
reductions. Granting exemptions to developing countries, however, can compromise
the efficiency of the treaty. Side payments in international treaties provide induce-
ments for voluntary cooperation by countries for whom treaties would otherwise fail
to yield welfare gains. This paper analyzes the conditions under which the side pay-
ments that are necessary to induce the participation of developing countries in an
efficient climate control treaty can also satisfy prevailing notions of fairness in inter-
national climate control.
International agreements are necessary to overcome the free-rider problem and
provide global public goods like climate control. Ideally, international treaties would
be efficient as well as equitable. An efficient climate control treaty will satisfy two
conditions. First, the treaty will produce the optimal level of global emissions abate-
ment. At the optimal level of global emissions abatement, the global marginal benefit
from the last unit of emissions reduction is equal to the global marginal cost1. Second,
the treaty will minimize the total cost of global emissions abatement by allocating
emissions abatement across countries in some way that equalizes countries’ marginal
abatement costs. A treaty that satisfies both of these conditions is efficient because it
maximizes the potential net benefit from global emissions reduction. An inefficient
treaty, therefore, is one that fails to satisfy one or both of these conditions.
Two problems immediately arise in designing an efficient treaty. First, not all
countries may benefit equally from climate control. Second, equalizing marginal abate-
ment costs will require countries with lower marginal abatement costs to abate more
than countries with higher marginal abatement costs. This implies that an efficient
climate control treaty may generate greater net benefits for some countries than for
others and that some countries could potentially be worse off due to their participa-
tion in the treaty. In which case, side payments will be necessary to induce sovereign
nations to join an efficient climate control treaty.
However, it is also true that countries do not equally share responsibility for the
build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that is driving climate change. Nor do516 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
all countries exhibit equal ability to pay for the costs of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. The prevailing notion of equity in climate control recognizes that some
countries should bear more of the burden for combating climate change than others.
This notion of equity motivated the Kyoto Protocol’s basic framework, which assigns
countries differentiated responsibilities for reducing emissions according to their abil-
ity to pay and historic contribution to the problem of climate change. The Kyoto Pro-
tocol exempts developing countries from mandatory emissions reductions and assigns
compulsory emissions reduction targets to the developed countries2. However, while
the exemptions can be applauded on equity grounds, they have likely compromised
the efficiency of the treaty. Because of the exemptions, the treaty provides little in-
centive to developing countries to limit their own emissions which are increasing at
alarming rates3. The treaty, therefore, fails to produce the optimal level of global
emissions abatement. Moreover, because the treaty does not require developing coun-
tries to reduce their emissions, abatement will take place mostly in the developed
world where marginal abatement costs are higher4. Numerous analyses of the Kyoto
Protocol have demonstrated that it neither minimizes the total cost of global abate-
ment nor produces enough global abatement to minimize the risk of climate change5.
As policy makers continue to debate the inefficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol and
possible alternatives, the issue repeatedly raised is whether it is possible to improve
efficiency by imposing mandatory emissions limits on developing countries without
sacrificing equity. The current Kyoto framework enables developing countries to ben-
efit from other countries’ abatement efforts without paying for any of the cost. Admit-
tedly, it is difficult to conceive of an alternative climate control framework that could
treat the developing countries as favorably while avoiding the inefficiencies inherent
to exemptions. One approach is to impose emissions limits on developing countries,
but to transfer the cost to the developed countries. The willingness of developed coun-
tries to participate in such a treaty, however, will depend on whether the treaty also
increases their own net benefits. If an international climate control agreement is to
be self-enforcing, all sovereign countries must find it in their own self-interests to
participate [Barrett, 1994].
By lowering global abatement costs and increasing the total level of global abate-
ment, an alternative treaty framework that imposes limits on developing country
emissions will generate a global efficiency gain that can potentially render all coun-
tries better off, depending upon how it is distributed. Side payments are a mechanism
for distributing the global efficiency gain, enabling a distinction between where abate-
ment takes place worldwide and who pays for it6. That side payments can be used to
relax binding participation constraints and improve the efficiency of an international
treaty is well known. However, because equity remains a priority in international
climate control efforts, the key issue is whether the side payments that would be
necessary to induce countries’ voluntary cooperation with an efficient treaty can also
achieve equity for developing countries. This will be the case if the countries that
require side payments to participate in an efficient climate control treaty are develop-
ing countries. In which case, side payments could be viewed as a more efficient and
direct approach to attaining fairness for developing countries than exemptions.517 SIDE PAYMENTS OR EXEMPTIONS: EQUITABLE CLIMATE CONTROL
Articles by Barrett [1999], Maler and DeZeeuw [1998], Chen [1997], and Tahvonen
[1993] demonstrate how differences in countries’ benefits and costs from participating
in various environmental agreements affect countries’ incentives to participate. This
paper analyzes which types of countries will require side payments to participate in an
efficient climate control treaty when countries’ abatement costs and benefits differ.
The purpose is to determine whether the side payments that are necessary to induce
an efficient treaty outcome can also satisfy the prevailing notion of fairness in climate
control. Accordingly, this paper contributes to an emerging literature [Caplan, Cornes,
and Silva, 2003; Chichilnisky, Heal, and Starrett, 2000; Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994]
that rethinks the linkages between equity and efficiency in global climate control. The
paper begins with a basic model of two countries with identical abatement costs and
benefits to illustrate the efficiency gains produced by cooperation with an interna-
tional climate control treaty. Subsequent models introduce key differences in the
countries’ abatement costs and benefits to illustrate more complicated relationships
between equity and efficiency, some of which are counterintuitive.
THE BASIC MODEL: IDENTICAL MARGINAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
In this basic model, there are two countries, C1 and C2, that generate carbon
emissions. Carbon emissions are trans-boundary pollutants that can accumulate in
the atmosphere and cause global warming. Reducing carbon emissions in either coun-
try generates a global public good, abatement. The magnitude of each country’s ben-
efit from the level of abatement produced globally is a function of its own damages
from global warming. Abatement costs in each country are a function of the opportu-
nity costs of its abatement activity. Thus, each country’s benefits are a function of
total world abatement while each country’s costs are a function of only of its own
abatement. Initially, it is assumed that both countries have the same abatement ben-
efit and cost functions. This assumption is relaxed in subsequent models.
In line with standard assumptions, the total cost of abatement in each country is
an increasing function of its own abatement. This is most easily expressed with a
linear marginal cost function for each country in the form MC1 = x1 and MC2 = x2, where
x1 and x2 represent abatement levels in C1 and C2 respectively7. Summing together
each country’s abatements yields total global abatement X, such that X = x1 + x2. The
marginal cost function for the world is the horizontal summation of each country’s
marginal cost schedule and is given by MCw = X/2.
This basic model assumes diminishing marginal benefits from abatement. This is
most easily expressed with a linear marginal benefit function in the form MB1 = MB2 =
1-X. Note that the intercept of this marginal benefit function, which is normalized to
one for simplicity in this and subsequent models, determines the magnitude of mar-
ginal abatement benefits. Because abatement is a global public good, abatement in
one country produces a positive external benefit for all other countries. Therefore,
the marginal abatement benefit for any one country from a unit of abatement is less
than the sum of the marginal abatement benefits for all countries combined. The
marginal benefit function for the world is the vertical summation of each country’s
marginal benefit schedule and is given by MBw = MB1 + MB2 = 2-2X.518 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
X* denotes the optimal level of global abatement where the global marginal ben-
efit from the last unit of abatement is equal to the global marginal cost. This is the
level of global abatement than an efficient climate control treaty would generate.
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Solving condition 1 for X* finds the optimal level of global abatement equal to 4/5. In
figure 1, X* indicates the optimal level of global abatement.
FIGURE 1
Identical Marginal Benefits and Costs
Efficiency also requires that a climate control treaty minimize the cost of global
abatement. This requires allocating abatement across countries such that all coun-
tries have the same marginal abatement cost. Equalizing marginal abatement costs
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Solving condition 2 finds x1 = x2 = 2/5. Given equal and rising marginal abatement cost
functions for the two countries in this model, minimizing global abatement costs re-
quires each country to produce one-half of the total level of global abatement.
The cooperative outcome in these models is full participation by all countries in
an efficient climate control treaty. Countries can only be expected to voluntarily par-
ticipate in an efficient climate control treaty if the treaty increases their net benefits
as compared to the no treaty or non-cooperative outcome8. The non-cooperative out-
come finds each country abating at its Nash equilibrium. Each country will choose its
own level of abatement to maximize its net benefit from abatement given the abate-
ment level of the other country. The Nash equilibrium level of abatement for C1
solves the maximization problem:
(3) MaxTB xx TC x NB xx
x1
112 11 112 (,) () (,) −=
where x1 and x2 represent abatement levels in C1 and C2 respectively, TB1 represents total
benefits to C1 , TC1 represents total costs to C1 , and NB1 represents net benefits to C1.
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which is equivalent to
(4) MC x MB x x 11 11 2 () ( ) =+520 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In this model where C1 and C2 have identical abatement cost and benefit functions, the
first order condition for C2 similarly reduces to
(5) MC x MB x x 22 21 2 () ( ) =+
Solving equations (4) and (4.1) for x1 and x2 finds that each country’s Nash equilibrium
level of abatement is equal to 1/3. This generates total global abatement at the Nash
equilibrium equal to 2/3, which is less than the optimal level of global abatement. In
figure 1, XN represents the total level of global abatement at the Nash equilibrium.
Comparing the Nash equilibrium level of global abatement to the optimal level of
global abatement demonstrates why an international climate control treaty is neces-
sary. When each country considers only its own costs and benefits from abatement, it
abates less than what is optimal from the perspective of global efficiency. This is the
essence of the free rider problem. No country has an incentive to abate more than its
Nash equilibrium level unless the other country commits to the same.
An efficient treaty which induces the full participation of all countries in this
model will increase global abatement from XN to X* and generate a global efficiency
gain equal to the shaded triangle area in figure 1. The total global benefit from abate-
ment is given by
TB X dx X X w
X
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Therefore, the global net benefit from abatement is given by
(6) NB TB TC X X
X




Evaluating equation (6) at abatement levels X* and XN finds the world net benefit from
optimal abatement (i.e., the treaty level of abatement) and the world net benefit at the
Nash equilibrium level of abatement (i.e., the no treaty level of abatement) equal to
36/45 and 35/45 respectively. Therefore, full participation in an efficient climate con-
trol treaty generates an efficiency gain equal to 1/45. In this first model where the two
countries have identical marginal abatement cost and benefit functions, the efficiency
gain is divided equally between them. Each country’s share of the efficiency gain is 1/90.521 SIDE PAYMENTS OR EXEMPTIONS: EQUITABLE CLIMATE CONTROL
Since the efficient treaty produces a welfare gain for both countries, both countries
have the incentive to sign the treaty.
Although this model predicts that both countries will find it in their self interests
to cooperate and sign the efficient treaty, the cooperative outcome is not necessarily a
stable outcome, i.e., one from which countries have no incentive to defect. There is a
difference between the incentive countries have to sign a particular treaty assuming
full cooperation by other countries, and the incentive countries may have to defect
from that treaty once other countries have signed. Barrett [1994] argues that interna-
tional environmental treaties can only be self-enforcing if individual countries have
no incentive to defect. Using a model in which the terms of the agreement, the num-
ber of signatories, and the actions of non-signatories are determined endogenously,
Barrett [1994] finds that when the efficiency gain produced by the treaty is large, a
self-enforcing treaty will involve only a small number of signatory countries. Barrett
assumed, as this first model does, that countries’ have identical linear marginal abate-
ment cost and benefit functions. However, when this assumption is relaxed, it is no
longer necessarily the case that full cooperation yields welfare gains for all countries.
In other words, when marginal abatement costs and benefits differ, some countries may
lack the incentive to sign the treaty, even if full cooperation by all other countries could
be ensured. In which case, side payments will be necessary to induce treaty signing.
IDENTICAL MARGINAL BENEFITS, DIFFERENT MARGINAL COSTS
When two countries have identical abatement cost and benefit functions, partici-
pating in an efficient climate control treaty is a Pareto improvement. The remainder
of this paper explores how differences in countries’ abatement benefits and costs give
rise to the need for side payments to induce countries’ participation. The first case
considered is one where countries have identical abatement benefits but different
abatement costs. As in the first basic model, each country’s marginal abatement ben-
efit function is given by MB1 = MB2 = 1-X. Accordingly, the marginal benefit function
for the world is given by MBw = MB1 + MB2 = 2 - 2X.
As in the first basic model, the marginal abatement cost function for C1 is given by
MC1 = x1. However, C2 now has lower marginal abatement costs than C1. The marginal
cost function for C2 is given by MC2 = x2 /β where β >1. The greater β  is, the greater is
the difference in marginal abatement costs between the two countries. Horizontal
summation of the two marginal cost functions yields the marginal cost function for
the world MCw = X /β +1. Equating the global marginal abatement cost and benefit
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from which it is clear that as β increases and abatement costs in C2 decline, the opti-
mal level of global abatement rises.
Efficiency also requires that the treaty equalize marginal abatement costs. For





























Because the cost of abatement is higher in C1 than C2, C2 abates β times more than C1
under an efficient treaty.
Because abatement is a global public good, each country’s total benefit is a func-
tion of global abatement, while each country’s total cost is a function of its share of
global abatement. Subtracting total abatement costs from total abatement benefits
yields net benefit functions for C1 and C2 equal to

















Unlike in the basic model, the two countries no longer have the same net benefit func-
tions. Total costs are higher in C2 because an efficient treaty requires C2 to do a greater
share of global abatement. As in the basic model, an efficient treaty will generate a
global increase in net benefits as compared to the no treaty Nash equilibrium outcome.
However, given that C2 derives the same benefit from optimal global abatement as C1
but must pay for a larger share of the total cost, the question is whether or not C2 finds
the efficient treaty in its own best interests to sign. This will depend on whether the
efficient treaty increases C2’s net benefits as compared to the Nash equilibrium.
Each country’s Nash equilibrium level of abatement is given by:
(11) MC x MB x x x
x
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Solving for x1 and x2 yields










This produces total global abatement in a Nash equilibrium XN = (β  +1)/(β  +2). This
is less than total global abatement would be under an efficient treaty. Since benefits
are the same in both countries and the cost of abatement is β times more costly in C1,
C2 again does β times more abatement than C1.
Plugging XN = (β  +1)/(β  + 2) and x2 = (β)/(β +2) into equation (10) and solving for












Similarly, substituting X* = (β +1)/(β + 3/2) and x2 = (β)/(β + 3/2) into equation (10)












C2 should be willing to sign an efficient treaty if the treaty raises its net benefits as
compared to the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the necessary condition for coopera-
tion by C2 is given by
(13)




















from which it is clear the value of β determines whether or not C2 has an incentive to
sign the treaty. Solving condition 13 numerically finds β =2.8 as the value of β that
equates net benefits for C2 under the treaty and Nash outcomes.
The critical β value that equates net benefits under an efficient treaty and the no
treaty Nash outcome for a low abatement cost country like C2 depends on the specifi-
cations of the marginal abatement cost and benefit functions. In this particular case
where abatement benefits are the same for both countries, a difference in abatement
costs of 2.8 times or more is sufficient to prevent treaty participation by the lower
abatement cost country. This is because an efficient treaty will require this country to524 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
do more of the abatement, thereby decreasing global abatement costs. As global abate-
ment costs fall, the optimal level of abatement rises. Although the lower abatement
cost country also benefits from the increase in global abatement, it pays for a larger
share of the cost. Therefore, there must be some critical value for the difference in
marginal abatement costs between countries such that the lower abatement cost coun-
try prefers the Nash outcome and will not voluntarily participate in an efficient treaty
unless side payments are made.
IDENTICAL MARGINAL COSTS, DIFFERENT MARGINAL BENEFITS
This model explores the influence of real or perceived differences in benefits on
the incentives of individual countries to cooperate with an efficient climate control
treaty. As in the original model, the marginal abatement cost functions are the same
for both countries and are given by MC1 = x1 and MC2= x2. This implies a world mar-
ginal cost function given by MCw = X/2. The marginal benefit function for C2 will be the
same as in the original model, MB2 = 1-X. However, now C1 benefits more from emis-
sions abatement than C2. The marginal benefit function for C1 is given by MB1 = K-X,
where K>1 indicates that C1 benefits K more per each additional unit of abatement than
C2. . The greater K is, the greater is the difference in benefits between the two countries.
This way of expressing differences in abatement benefits between countries pre-
sumes that marginal benefits diminish at the same rate in both countries, but that
one country’s marginal benefits are K times higher than the other’s for every level of
abatement. This also implies that marginal benefits will cease at a lower abatement
level for the low benefiting country than the high benefiting country9. As illustrated in
figure 2, for abatement levels 0<X<1, marginal abatement benefits are positive for
both countries. In that range, the world marginal benefit function is equal to the
horizontal summation of the two countries’ marginal benefit functions and is given by
MBw = (K+1)-2X. However, for all X ≥ 1, the only country that continues to benefit
from global abatement is the high benefiting country, C1. This means that the world
marginal benefit function is equivalent to C1’s marginal benefit function for all X ≥ 1.
This explains the “kink” in the world marginal benefit function at X=1.
At the optimal global level of abatement, MCw = MBw. Given that the MBw = (K+1)-
2X for all X<1 and MB w = K-X for all X ≥ 1, there are two possible solutions for X*. The
value of K determines whether the world marginal cost function intersects the world
marginal benefit function at X<1 or X ≥ 1. Simulation finds that for all K<3/2, X*<1 and
equation (14) denotes the optimal level of global abatement. For all K ≥ 3/2, X*  ≥ 1 and
equation (15) denotes the optimal level of global abatement.
In figure 2, it is evident that for K ≥ 3/2, an efficient treaty produces a level of
abatement beyond the capacity of the low benefiting country, C2, to benefit. However,
an efficient treaty will also equalize marginal abatement costs across countries. Since
both countries have identical marginal abatement costs in this model, an efficient
treaty will allocate one-half of total global abatement to each country. When K=3/2,
optimal global abatement is equal to 1. C2’s net benefit from an efficient treaty (.38) is
less than its net benefit under the Nash equilibrium (.48) and it has no incentive to
sign an efficient treaty. When K increases beyond 3/2, optimal global abatement ex-
ceeds 1. For all units of abatement beyond 1, C2’s marginal abatement benefits are525 SIDE PAYMENTS OR EXEMPTIONS: EQUITABLE CLIMATE CONTROL
negative, though its marginal abatement costs are positive. This means that when K
exceeds 3/2, C2 derives an even greater net benefit from the Nash outcome than the
efficient treaty outcome. Therefore, whenever K ≥ 3/2, C2 will have no incentive to
sign an efficient climate control treaty.
FIGURE 2
Different Marginal Benefits, Identical Marginal Costs
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For all K< 3/2, X*<1 and C2’s marginal benefit from the last unit of abatement is
positive. However, it still benefits less from abatement than C1 and is required by an
efficient treaty to do one-half of the total abatement. Whether C2 is willing to sign the
efficient treaty depends on whether the treaty raises its net benefits as compared to the
Nash equilibrium. Solving equation (14) finds optimal global abatement X* = 2(K+1)/5.
Each country will abate one-half of X* such that x1 = x2 = (K+1)/5.
The Nash equilibrium levels of abatement for each country are given by
(16) MC x MB xx x
Kx
11 11 2 1
2
2
() ( ) =+ = =
−
(17) M C xM B x xx
x
22 21 2 2
1 1
2
() ( ) =+ = =
−
.















This yields total abatement under a Nash equilibrium XN= (K+1)/3.







Plugging X* = 2(K+1)/5 and x2 = (K+1)/5 into equation (18) finds net benefits to C2 from









Plugging XN= (K+1)/3 and x2=(2-K)/3 into equation (18) finds net benefits to C2 from
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Condition 19 is satisfied for all K ≤ 1.05. For all K>1.05, side payments are required to
induce C2’s cooperation.
The critical value for K that precludes treaty signing by the low benefiting country
is particular to this model. Nevertheless, this model reveals that if abatement ben-
efits differ sufficiently between countries, side payments will be necessary to induce a
low benefiting country to participate in an efficient treaty. Even though it benefits
less, the low benefiting country will be required to abate at the same level as the high
benefiting country and that level will rise due to its participation in the treaty. This is
because including the low benefiting country in the efficient treaty increases global
abatement benefits, thereby increasing the optimal level of global abatement. This
implies that there must be some critical value for the difference in countries’ mar-
ginal abatement benefits such that a low benefiting country will be worse off under an
efficient treaty than it would have been otherwise.
FIGURE 3
Constant Marginal Costs, Different Marginal Benefits
In this model where marginal abatement benefits differ, the significance of rising
marginal abatement costs is apparent. Figure 3 presents the case of different mar-
ginal abatement benefits and constant marginal abatement costs. With constant mar-
ginal abatement costs, only the high benefiting country abates in the Nash equilib-
rium. The high benefiting country, C1, will abate at XN, where MB1 = MC1. At XN, the
marginal cost to C2 exceeds its marginal benefit, so it has no incentive to abate at all.
If, however, marginal costs are rising, C2 will abate some in the Nash equilibrium
because the marginal costs of its initial abatements are less than its marginal ben-
efits. In general, the “flatter” the marginal cost function, the more C1 abates than C2 at
a Nash equilibrium. If the low benefiting country is abating less under the Nash, it
has even less of an incentive to abate more under an efficient treaty. Therefore, the
flatter the marginal abatement cost function, the less likely it is that the low benefit-
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DIFFERENT MARGINAL BENEFITS, DIFFERENT MARGINAL COSTS
This model explores the incentives for treaty signing when both abatement costs
and benefits differ across countries. In this model, marginal abatement costs are ris-
ing and marginal abatement costs are β times lower in C2 than C1. This yields marginal
abatement cost functions, MC1= x1 and MC2= x2 /β where β  >1 and a world marginal
cost function, MC w = X/(β +1). One country, C1, benefits K more than C2 from each
additional unit of abatement. But in this model, constant marginal benefits are as-
sumed10. This yields marginal abatement functions, MB1 = K where K>1 and MB2 = 1.
Vertical summation yields a world marginal benefit function, MBw = (K+1).
Solving for the optimal level of global abatement X* by equating the world mar-
ginal benefit and cost functions finds X* = (K+1)(β +1). As the benefits from emissions
abatement increases (i.e., K increases) and the costs of emissions abatement decline
(i.e., β rises), the optimal level of global abatement rises. An efficient treaty will allo-
cate emissions abatement across countries such that MC1=MC2 and x1+x2= X*. Solving
for the values of x1 and x2 that satisfy these conditions finds x1 =(K+1) and x2=β (K+1).
As in previous models, each country’s marginal abatement costs are a function of
only its own level of abatement. However, because constant marginal benefits have
been assumed in this model, marginal abatement benefits are no longer a function of
either country’s abatement level. This means that, in the absence of a treaty, each
country chooses an abatement level that is optimal for that country regardless of what
the other country does11. In a Nash equilibrium, each country produces abatement
until its marginal cost from the last unit of abatement is equivalent to its constant
marginal benefit. Therefore, in a Nash equilibrium, x1=K and x2 =β, for total global
abatement in a Nash equilibrium XN = K+β.
As in previous models, an efficient treaty generates an increase in global net
benefits as compared to the Nash equilibrium. Previous models demonstrated the
disincentives to treaty signing for the country with lower marginal abatement costs
and benefits. Comparing net benefits from the Nash equilibrium and efficient treaty
outcome to the low benefiting and low abatement cost country in this model determines










Plugging X*= (K+1)(β +1) and x2=β (K+1) into equation (20) finds C2’s net benefits from










Plugging XN= K+β and x2= β into equation (20) finds C2’s net benefits from the Nash










C2 will voluntarily cooperate in an efficient treaty as long as NB2(Treaty) ≥NB2(Nash).















Condition 21 demonstrates that there is a critical combination of differential mar-
ginal abatement benefits and costs that will yield voluntary cooperation. An increase
in β implies an increase in global abatement under an efficient treaty and an increased
share of abatement for C2, even though it benefits less. If K is also large, an efficient
treaty will require more global abatement and C2’s share of the net benefits from the
treaty predictably will be small. C2 will prefer the Nash outcome. The more that
countries differ in terms of their marginal abatement costs, the less they can differ in
terms of their marginal abatement benefits and still be expected to voluntarily cooper-
ate. This model predicts that side payments will be necessary to induce cooperation
from countries that are both low benefitters and low cost abaters.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The previous models demonstrate that an efficient treaty raises global net ben-
efits as compared to the no-treaty Nash equilibrium outcome. The source of the global
welfare gain is two-fold. First, the treaty requires each country that participates to
internalize the external benefits of its own emissions reduction, thereby securing the
optimal level of global emissions abatement. Second, the treaty minimizes the total
cost of global abatement by equalizing countries’ marginal abatement costs. However,
even though an efficient treaty can make every country better off as compared to the
Nash equilibrium, whether or not it will make every country better off depends on
how the global efficiency gain is distributed. What these models have demonstrated is
that an efficient treaty fails to yield an increase in net benefits for low abatement cost
and (or) low abatement benefit countries when countries’ abatement costs and ben-
efits differ substantially. The participation of these countries, however, is critical to
achieving an efficient treaty outcome. Side payments, therefore, are necessary to
induce voluntary cooperation by countries that have lower abatement costs and (or)
benefit less from global emissions abatement.
When abatement costs and benefits differ substantially, efficiency will require the
use of side payments. The direction of side payments, however, also has implications
for global equity. Since the prevailing notion of equity as reflected in the Kyoto Proto-
col recognizes that developing countries should not pay for the cost of mitigating
global climate change, a convenient link between equity and efficiency emerges if530 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
developing countries are the recipients of side payments under an efficient treaty. As
these models demonstrate, developing countries will be the recipients of an efficient
treaty if their abatement costs are lower than developed countries and (or) they ben-
efit less from emissions abatement.
It is generally assumed that developing countries have lower marginal abatement
costs than developed countries. This is based on the presumption of rising marginal
abatement costs and the observation that developing countries, as a group, have en-
gaged in less emissions abatement activity than developed countries thus far. Many
low cost options for reducing emissions still exist in the developing world, such as fuel-
switching, implementing basic energy efficiency measures, and sequestering carbon
emissions through forestry. The availability of such low cost abatement options in the
developing world prompted the inclusion of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
in the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM allows developed countries to obtain credit toward
their own emissions targets for abatement activity that takes place in the developing
world12
Whether or not developing countries will benefit less than developed countries
from reducing the risk of climate change is a more complicated issue. Predicting
which countries will endure greater damage from climate change is difficult, as scien-
tists remain uncertain about the exact scale and timing of climate change. It is likely
that developing countries in Africa and the tropics will suffer declines in agricultural
productivity, losses to the resource intensive sectors of their economies, and the spread
of climate related diseases. Moreover, low-lying developing countries and developing
countries with extensive coastlines may suffer the effects of rising sea-levels. Nordhaus
and Boyer [2000] estimate sectoral damages from global warming for different regions
in the world. Their model predicts that the U.S. and China will suffer the lowest
aggregate damages from climate change, .45 percent and .20 percent of GDP respec-
tively. Nordhaus and Boyer predict the highest aggregate damages for India at 4.9
percent of GDP. Damages for the U.S., Russia, Japan, and China will be modest, while
Europe, India, Africa, and many middle income, lower middle income, and lower in-
come countries may be significantly impacted.
 A country’s potential damages from climate change are largely a function of its
geographic location and climate. The location of so many developing countries in tropical
and sub-tropical regions suggests than developing countries may, on average, suffer
more damage from climate change that many developed countries. However, compar-
ing countries’ damages from climate change as a means for identifying which coun-
tries will benefit more from global emissions reduction presumes that developed and
developing countries value income the same at the margin. This is highly unlikely
given the vast income disparities that characterize the divide between developed and
developing countries. Since the value of what is damaged on the margin is greater in
developed countries than developing countries, developed countries benefit more from
each unit of abatement. This could explain the reticence of so many developing coun-
tries to partake in current climate control efforts. Reducing emissions to prevent
future climate change means forgoing income today, a luxury many developing coun-
tries simply do not have.531 SIDE PAYMENTS OR EXEMPTIONS: EQUITABLE CLIMATE CONTROL
If indeed developing countries benefit less than developed countries from emis-
sions reduction and can reduce emissions at relatively lower cost, side payments to
developing countries may be necessary to induce their participation in an efficient
climate control treaty. At a minimum, side payments will render the developing coun-
tries no worse off than they were prior to their involvement with the efficient treaty.
This should allay the fears of many that involving developing countries in a climate
control treaty necessarily means mitigating climate change at developing countries’
expense. Side payments, in fact, could be used in an efficient treaty to make even
further concessions to equity. As long as an efficient treaty generates a global welfare
gain, developed countries could allocate the entire global efficiency gain to the devel-
oping countries and still be no worse off themselves than they were beforehand.
What these models reveal is that side payments to developing countries are justi-
fied on efficiency as well as equity grounds. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, a climate
control treaty that involves the participation of developing countries need not sacri-
fice equity to achieve efficiency. Side payments avoid the inefficiencies inherent to
exemptions and provide a more direct mechanism for addressing equity in interna-
tional climate control. Policy makers should remain mindful of the efficiency and
equity implications of side payments as they contemplate revisions and alternatives to
the Kyoto Protocol
NOTES
1. Because emissions abatement is a global public good, abatement in one country produces a positive
external benefit for all other countries. The global marginal benefit from a unit of abatement is
equal to the sum of each country’s marginal benefit from abatement. The optimal level of global
abatement internalizes the positive externality associated with each individual country’s own
emission abatement.
2. On average, the developed countries must reduce their emissions by 5.2 percent below their 1990
baseline emissions levels during the commitment period, 2008-2012.
3. The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) does allow the developed countries
to pay for some emissions abatement in the developing world and apply the resulting “emissions
credits” toward their own quotas. However, the Kyoto Protocol restricts the scale and scope of
abatement activity that can take place under the CDM due to concerns for the permanence,
verifiability, and additionality of emissions reductions in developing countries.
4. This presumes rising marginal abatement costs and low cost options for reducing emissions in the
developing world that have not yet been exhausted.
5. A special issue of The Energy Journal, “The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-model Evalua-
tion”[1999] compiles the results of thirteen different analyses of the costs of the Kyoto Protocol
under different implementation regimes. Cline [2001] and Weyent and Hill [1999] provide over-
views of the analyses and the results.
6. The manner in which side payments could be made could vary depending upon how the treaty is
structured. For example, if the treaty allocated non-tradable emissions targets to countries, side
payments could take the form of lump sum income transfers between countries. If the treaty
instead allocated tradable emissions permits to countries, the distribution of initial permits could
serve as side payments.
7. Non-linear marginal abatement benefit and cost functions were tried, but analytical solutions
could not be derived. Linear marginal abatement benefit and cost functions are used in the
literature for the same reason. See Barrett [1994].
8. This and all subsequent models assume zero transactions costs associated with treaty negotiation
and implementation.532 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
9. An alternative way to express differences in benefits would have been to give both marginal
benefit functions the same horizontal intercept but different slopes. However, there is no reason
to suspect that one country’s marginal benefits diminish faster than another’s. There is evidence
to suggest that some countries benefit more from abatement than others.
10. Constant marginal benefits is a necessary assumption in order to derive an analytical solution for
this model, but it is not without precedent in the literature. For example, Nordhaus [1991] and
Nordhaus and Boyer [2000] assume constant marginal benefits, arguing that marginal changes in
the flow of carbon emissions will have a negligible impact upon the stock of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and the marginal benefit from emissions reduction is more or less invariant to the
current level of abatement. Diminishing returns to abatement are still expected over a wider
range of abatement levels.
11. Unlike in the previous models, the Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
12. The amount of credits each developed country can receive are limited. Therefore, the CDM cannot
equalize marginal abatement costs between countries.
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